The Importance of Matagorda during the Civil War

The Importance of Matagorda Island during the Civil War

Excerpts from

The War of the Rebellion

8/9/2008

The citations in this paper were taken from actual records from various sources as they perceived what was happening on Matagorda Island from 1861 until 1864. It is an attempt to shed more light on James R Marmion’s role when he was in the Texas Navy.

The citations in this study are from the book WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, BY BVT. LIEUT. COL. ROBERT N. SCOTT, THIRD U.S. ARTILLERY AND

PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS. THIS WAS APPROVED JUNE 16, 1880. The book was published in 1891.

There were 47 records found that dealt with Matagorda Island. The following citations show how various individuals looked at the conflict that was occurring during the Civil War.

Series 1 - Volume 4

CHAP. XI       CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—CONFEDERATE

Page: 117

SAN ANTONIO, TEX., October 10, 1861.

Col. H. E. MOCULLOCH, San Antonio, Tex.:

        COLONEL:   In consequence of your request to furnish you with some

information relative to the present condition of the defenses at Pass Cavallo, I have the honor to state that Captain Shea’s battery of four

24-pounder guns is very much exposed, and is at present almost in a

defenseless condition from any combined attack by land and sea or

from any considerable force by land alone. The intention of Captain

Shea was to erect a closed work (redonbt), but after commencing the

work he was ordered from headquarters to desist from the further

prosecution of the same until some officer detailed for the purpose

should inspect the Pass and report upon the location and plan of the

work. This officer has not yet arrived there. Captain Shea’s battery

is at present situated near the light-house on Matagorda Island, and

can only defend the principal entrance or ship channel into Matagorda

Bay. The nearest point from which re-enforcements could be expected

in case of an attack would be Indianola, distant about 15 miles from

the Pass, and between these two points two large bayous exist, over

which no sufficient means for crossing are provided. The East Pass or

channel has no defenses whatever. From these facts you can perceive,

colonel, the urgent necessity that exists for the placing of these points

in a proper state of defense, or that the troops and guns already there

be withdrawn from so exposed a position.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                              A. BUCHEL,

                       Lieutenant- Colonel Third Regiment Texas Infantry.

Series 1 - Volume 26 (Part I)

CHAP: XXXVIIW   FLA., S. ALA., S. MISS., LA., TEX., N. MEX. LA

Pages: 420 - 22

                                      HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

                                      New Orleans, December 5, 1863.

Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,

               Commanding Forces on Matagorda Bay, Texas:

        GENERAL: The major-general commanding the department has re-

ceived with great satisfaction your report announcing the capture of

the works of the enemy at Port Cavallo. You will be duly re-enforced

and supplied. The Second Regiment Engineers, Corps d’Afrique, sails

this p. in., with 6rders to report to you for duty on the fortifications, and

troops of other arms will be forwarded as rapidly as practicable. Mean-

time the commanding general desires that you scout actively all the

country in your front, and make such demonstrations in the direction

of Indianola and Palacios as your means. may allow, with a view to

amuse and confuse the enemy as to your intentions, while you press

your scouts in the direction of Coney Creek, and gain reliable informa-

tion as to the roads, the present condition of the country, and the means

that would be required to move a large force through it.

        The major general commanding desires you to understand that an

advance of your forces will bring down upon you the concentrated forces

of the enemy; and that you must be largely re-enforced before such

advance is made. Until such time you will be well employed in

strengthening your present position, rendering your men as comfortable

as possible, and preparing them for efficient service when the advance

shall be ordered. Fuel has been ordered to you; also tents and lumber.

Very respectfully, 1 am, general, your obedient servant,

CHAS. P. STONE

Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.

No. 4.

Report of Col. Henry D. Washburn, Eighteenth Indiana Infantry, com-

manding First Brigade, of expedition against and capture of Fort

        Esperanza.     SALURIA, TEx., December 3, 1863.

        MAJOR: I beg leave to submit the following report of the part

taken by the First Brigade, First Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, in

the reduction of Fort Esperanza, on Matagorda Island:

        At midnight, November 25, I had succeeded, after much difficulty, in

getting the whole of my force across Cedar Bayou, upon the island, and marched immediately to join General Ransom, some 8 miles in advance. After a few hours’ rest, we moved up the island, making a very hard march through the sand of 23 miles; camped for the night, and moved in the morning for this place, my brigade, by your order, moving along the beach. About 12 o’clock we had advanced to the light-house, and in close proximity to the enemy’s works. The main portion of the command was halted, and, by your order, I proceeded with one company from each of my regiments, under the command of Capt.

Ira Moore, Thirty-third Illinois, a most excellent officer, supported by

the Thirty-third Regiment Illinois Infantry, to reconnoiter, and endeavor

to find the strength and position of the enemy. Moving cautiously up the beach, we soon drove in the enemy’s picket and our advance was safely lodged in a range of sand hills, within 300 yards of the outer work of the enemy-2-a heavy earthwork, extending from the bay to a lagoon running from the bay on the mainland side of the island. The work was regularly laid out, about 15 feet in thickness, and from 10 to 15 feet in height.

        The enemy now opened upon us from Fort Esperanza with his 128-

pounder and 24s, throwing shells, but with little or no effect. Having

found out the position and apparent strength of the enemy, by your order I withdrew my advance. During the night, a heavy norther coming on, we were unable to do much the 28th. The night of the 28th, Captain McCallister, of the Eighth Indiana, and Captain Hull, of the Ninety-ninth Illinois, both of whom had had considerable experience in that line in the rear of Vicksburg, with a fatigue party from each of the regiments in the brigade, under cover of the darkness, dug a rifle-pit from the sand hills on the beach occupied by us the first day, and running parallel with the enemy’s works, 210 yards in length, sufficient to cover a regiment. Sergeant Goodlander, of Company F, Eighth Indiana, with a small detail from the different regiments, was ordered to move at early dawn in advance of our rifle-pit, and endeavor to gain a position on the outer edge of the enemy’s works. The Eighth Indiana was also moved out, and ordered to lie down in the open prairie, in order to take advantage of any lodgment our advance might make. Captain Hull, of the Ninety-ninth, volunteered, and accompanied the advance. The morning was bitterly cold, and our men suffered severely. Our advance moved up slowly and cautiously, took position on the outside of the work, the inside being controlled by the enemy in the sand hills between the work and the main fort, driving in a small picket force on the inside, the force for protection of the work having been driven by the weather to the sand hills. They endeavored to rally and drive our men back, but in vain. The Eighth Indiana was immediately sent forward in small detachments, so as to avoid the fire of the heavy guns of the fort, and gained a safe footing in our rifle-pit and on the enemy’s work. Finding ourselves more successful than I had dared to hope, I returned to the main portion of my brigade, and immediately sent Colonel Lippincott with his regiment to the front, with instructions to take command of the force in front, and to advance as fast as prudence would allow, and to get, if possible, a position where our artillery might be made effective. Colonel Lippincott moved promptly with his command, and I soon had the pleasure of hearing from him that he had secured a good position for our artillery.

        Adjt. W W. Zener, of the Eighteenth Indiana, now on my staff, was

ordered to bring up two pieces of the Seventh Michigan Battery, under

command of Lieutenant Stillman, which he accomplished with dispatch.

Page: 427-8

                              HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,

                               Fort Esperanza, Tex., December 6, 1863.

        MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, on the 22d ultimo, in obedi-

ence to the order of Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn, I moved my command

(consisting of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Maine and Thirty-fourth

Iowa Infantry and Battery F, First Missouri Artillery) from Aransas

Pass, 8 miles up Saint Joseph’s Island, and encamped at a ranch for the

night. Moved on the next morning, and reached Cedar Bayou about

noon 23d ultimo, where my advance guard of mounted infantry, under

command of Capt. C. S. Ilsley, Fifteenth Maine, had a slight skirmish

with a scouting party of the enemy, in which Maj. Charles Hill, com-

manding the rebel party, was killed, and Sergt. James Saunders, Com-

pany F, Fifteenth Maine, was slightly wounded. I halted at this place,

and commenced the construction of a ferry across Cedar Bayou.

        On the 25th ultimo, I ferried my command across Cedar Bayou, and

encamped about 7 miles up Matagorda Island, where I was joined by

Colonel Washburn’s brigade about midnight. On the 26th, I marched

my command about 20 miles up the island, and encamped at a ranch about 10 miles from this point. On the morning of the 27th, I advanced my brigade, under the direction of General Washburn, up the middle of the island, while Colonel Washburn moved his brigade in a parallel line up the Gulf beach. About 11 a. m. we met the advanced pickets of the enemy, and drove them into his works. After reconnoitering and ascertaining the location of the outer works and main fort of the enemy, I placed my command in an advanced position indicated by General Washburn, on the left of our line and under cover of a slight rise of ground. This afternoon and the following day were occupied in reconnoitering the approaches to the enemy’s work, and was attended with occasional skirmishing and sharpshooting on both sides and occasional artillery shots from the enemy.

        On the night of the 28th, I threw up an earthwork in advance of my

left, and on the opposite side of a salt lagoon which intervened between

my position and the chief work of the enemy, where I placed Captain Foust’s battery, supported by the Thirty-fourth Iowa Infantry, and opened fire on the fort at daylight on the 29th, continuing at intervals all day. In the meantime the Seventh Michigan Battery, of Colonel Washburn’s brigade, had been advanced under cover of the sand hills on the beach, and opened upon the fort from the right of our line. No casualties occurred in my command. During the night of the 29^th ultimo the enemy evacuated their works and retired, setting fire to their magazines and stores.

        The whole of the troops of my command acquitted themselves credit.

ably, and bore the hardships of the severe norther of the 28th and 29th

on short rations with a cheerfulness scarcely to be expected from troops

most of whom had never experienced a field campaign.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                               T.E. G. RANSOM,

                               Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

                              Maj. WILLIAM II. MORGAN,

                               Assistant Adjutant. General, Coast Expedition.

Page: 429

        CHAP. XXXVIJI   THE RIO GRANDE EXPEDITION, ETC.

               RETURN OF SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION

No. 8.

Abstracts from “Record of Events” on the several returns of the Thir

teenth Army Corps, for October, November, and December, 1863.

December 1.—Left the foot of Matagorda Island, and marched to Fort

Esperanza, at the head of the island, arriving there on the 3d.

        December 6.—Crossed to De Cros’ Point, Matagorda Peninsula, and

went into camp, where we now are.

Pages: 826, 893,894, and 967

These pages contain charts of various commands at Matagorda Island.

Fort Esperanza, Matagorda Island, Tex. Expedition against and capture

of, Nov. 22—30, 1863. See Rio Grande  Expedition, Oct. 27—Dec. 2,         1863. Reports of Bradfute, W. B. Ransom, Thomas It. G.Washburn, Henry II.

Ireland, John. Washburn, Cadwallader C.

Series 1 - Volume 26 (Part II)

CHAP. XXXVIII  W. FLA., S. ALA., S. MISS., LA., TEX., N. MEX.

Page:  448

                                              MATAGORDA, TEX.,

                                              November 26, 1863—10 p. m.

Capt. EDMUND P. TURNER, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR:    I have just returned from Saluria. I arrived at that place at

2 o’clock last night. 11 gave the instructions to Colonel Bradfute, and

also the dispatches. The enemy is in force on Saint Joseph Island

supposed to be about 3,000. These forces have crossed their pickets

over on Matagorda island, 12 miles up the island, bringing them within

28 miles of the fort. The advance picket numbers about 175.

        There are a great many, or in, fact all, of the enemy’s cavalry force

mounted upon horses that were captured from our cavalry on Mustang

Island. They are reported to be fine horses.

        Yesterday there was a large transport passed in the direction of

Corpus [Christi] Pass; also another large transport passed this morning

in the same direction. All, I think, from the best information I can get,

will stop at Cedar Bayou or on Saint Joseph Island. I was also informed that the enemy had taken five light, draught steamers at Matamoras from King, Kennedy & Co. These steamers, I think, are on the coast of Saint Joseph Island. They were off Mustang Island two days ago. These steamers can run in any of the bays and rivers on this coast.

        Colonel Bradfute seems confident of holding the fort, and says if he

can get rations and assistance from the outside that he can hold against

any force.

        I have at this place, ready for transporting troops and supplies, the

John F. Carr, and also nine sailing vessels, sufficient to carry the troops

(Woods’ and Pyron’s regiments) intended for that place. I will leave for Colonels Woods’ and Pyron’s camps early in the morning. They can get down to this place by the time these boats can get on the commissary and quartermaster’s stores which they can carry without interfering with the transportation of troops.

        There is a very great necessity for a company or two of cavalry on

the island. The cavalry that are on duty on the island are raw militia,

that are driven in front of the enemy’s pickets at pleasure; neither can

they find out or are they sufficiently acquainted with troops to judge of

the number or force.

        I learn on my arrival at this place that all the mills on Old Caney are at work grinding meal for the Government. I will start as many of the schooners as can be spared up Old Caney for the meal and corn that is now and will be collected.

                               I will write you again from Columbia.

                               Yours, very respectfully,

                               J. A. MURRAY

                                Aide-de-Camp.

Series 1 - Volume 34 (Part I)

                               Red River Campaign

Page:  173

March ~.—Headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps removed from

New Orleans to Matagorda Island, Tex. Maj. A. Schwartz assumed

command of the Artillery Brigade, having been appointed chief of

artillery and ordnance of the corps.

Batteries G, First Michigan Light, and F, First Missouri Light, and the Sixteenth Ohio Battery on Matagorda Island, Tex. Battery A. Second Illinois Light Artillery and the Seventeenth Ohio Battery at New Orleans. Batteries B and E, First Missouri Light, at Brownsville, Tex. Battery E, Second Illinois Light, at Baton Rouge, La.

Page: 281

No. 14.

Itinery of the First Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, April 18 - May 22.*

        The Second Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Lawler, shipped from Matagorda Island to New Orleans April 18; arrived in that city on the 21st, left for Alexandria on the 24th, and arrived there the 26th. The brigade remained in the vicinity of Alexandria, skirmishing more or less every day with the enemy until May 13, when it marched with the army for the Mississippi.

        May 22.—Arrived safely at Morganza, La., where it has since remained. The Thirty-fourth Iowa Volunteers was transferred to the Fourth Division, May 11, by order of General Lawler, commanding detachment of Thirteenth Corps, in the field.

        April 25.—The Twenty-third Iowa and one wing of Twenty-second Iowa, belonging to First Brigade, shipped from Matagorda Island. Headquarters of the division and the remaining wing of the Twenty-second Iowa embarked for New Orleans April 29; arrived May 1.

        On May 4, left New Orleans with Twenty-third Iowa and left wing of Twenty-second Iowa Volunteers for Alexandria; arrived at Fort De Russy and found the river blockaded by heavy batteries. Returned to the mou4h of Red River, and remained until the army arrived at Sims port, when the troops joined it. The remainder of the First Brigade had not yet left Texas at last report.

Series 1 - Volume 34 (Part II)

Chap XLVI Correspondence, Etc - Union

Page: 71

SPECIAL ORDERS, Head Quarters THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

No. 8. Pass Cavallo, Tex., January 13, 1864.

I. Brig. Gen. T. E. G. Ransom, U. S. Volunteers, will for the

present assume command of the posts at Decrow’s Point and Matagorda Island. He will make all useful regulations, reporting his

orders to these headquarters as soon as issued for approval.

II. Colonel Cobb, commanding Second Engineers, Corps d’Afrique,

will assume immediate command of the post on Matagorda Island,

and will make daily reports to Brigadier-General Ransom.

III. The Twenty-third Iowa Volunteers will proceed to Indianola

and report to Brigadier-General Benton, commanding the First

Division.

IV. The Provisional Brigade, composed of the Thirteenth and

Fifteenth Maine Volunteers, and Twentieth and Thirty-fourth Iowa

Volunteers, is temporarily attached to the Fourth Division and will

report immediately to Brigadier-General Ransom, comman~1ing.

* * * * * * *

By order of N. J. T. Dana, major-general of volunteers:

WALTER B. SCATES,

Lient. Col. and A. A. G., Thirteenth Army Corps.

                CHAP. XLVI LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.

Pages: 101-4

                                      HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES IN TEXAS,

                                      Matagorda Peninsula, January 18, 1864.

Maj. Gen. E. 0. C. ORD,

Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps, New Orleans:

        I wrote you a hurried unofficial note by Major Seward yesterday,

and since then nothing of interest has transpired here.

        This is the sixth day since my arrival here, and my time has been

mostly occupied in reconnoitering. I spent one day at Indianola,

where all of the First Division now in Texas is concentrated, and where I have to-day ordered the Sixteenth Ohio Battery and one 30-pounder of Battery L, [First] Indiana. I have taken the brigade from Matagorda Island, and now have all the white troops at this pass now stationed on the peninsula under command of Ransom. Fort Esperanza is garrisoned by the Fourteenth Rhode Island Heavy Artillery and seven corn panics of the Second Engineers, Corps

d’Afrique, under command of Colonel Cobb. The forces at Indianola are under the immediate command of General Benton. I shall begin to fortify that place to a small extent.

        I presume you have had access to my reports made heretofore to

the major-general commanding the department, and are informed as to my views as to the disposition of the forces now on the Rio Grande; they are of no effect now, but if needed on that frontier should be mostly posted near the Nueces River. If the cavalry force now there, which has been nursed and organized with much trouble and great cost of time, is sent on a cotton hunt to Eagle Pass or that vicinity they will get cotton, but will make themselves unserviceable so far as the necessary and effective co-operation with

this force is concerned.

        All the cavalry there and the batteries of artillery and half the

infantry should march across the country to co-operate with this column, forming a junction near Victoria. All the infantry which does not march across should land at Corpus Christi or Copana and unite with the column again near San Patricio or Refugio. A movement of this force would at the same time meet that movement and support it either by its operations on the east or west of Lavaca Bay toward Texana, Hallettsville, or Victoria. A discreet officer, either General Herron or some other general officer, who, by his management, would prevent misunderstandings with our neighbors, and

would resist and discountenance corruption and speculation, should be put in command on the Rio Grande, with a garrison of 500 men at Brownsville and 200 at Brazos Island.

        As for the trade with Eagle Pass and Lavaca, the defeat of Magruder involves the entire regulation of all those matters, as well as the complete revolution of Texas. We must meet him in the open field and beat him, there wise we are wasting our time and forces to little effect, in occupying a few scattered points, the possession of which are not contested. We can beat him by concentrating a superior force and not allowing him time for more preparations. If we defeat him in the first general action Texas is revolutionized, and a large portion of its men will join us and his army will dissolve.

If we risk a campaign against him with an inferior force, we may beat him, but if he should defeat us, or even hold his own in the first general engagement, then we might justly expect to engage in a long campaign before we regained our present influence over the wavering portion of the population, whose confidence would be greatly shaken. I do not speak of a march up this peninsula, for I have no idea it will at the present time be entertained. I have been to the mouths of the Caney, San Bernard, and Brazos, where I occupied a day in reconnoitering and shelling, and at each of which places the enemy has erected strong works which cover considerable ground. He is evidently in force in that neighborhood and has several steamboats, three of which I saw carrying supplies on his inland waters. Some of these boats are “cotton-clad,” and one, the Carr, was lately supposed to have been destroyed. I have reason to suppose this is not so, or to believe the Carr still in order.

The mouth of the Caney is four marches from here and the mouth of the Brazos is five. Had the force of 4,000 men which first arrived here immediately pressed forward, it is most likely the forts on the mouth of the Brazos would have been in our possession at the end of six days, and the blow would have been a mortal one to the rebel cause; but to attempt that march now would be under very different circumstances. The whole force we have here now is not an equivalent for that which we then had, as estimated merely against numbers; and, in addition to this, the march would be contested and resisted at several points by fortifications across a narrow defile, where the enemy has expended a great deal of labor and skill in successive lines of defense to stop a line of approach, which, according to the information he has had, and judging from the demonstrations which have been made, he is convinced we had decided on. Magruder has a large cavalry force, and we have none; for want of it we cannot obtain information nor scout actively, and are unable to pursue and punish any of his prowlers or marauding parties. To commence active operations effectively we ought to have 3,000 good cavalry. We have little or no transportation and require 200 wagons and 50 ambulances. We are well supplied with subsistence at present, having on hand about thirty days’. We need much clothing, estimates of which have been sent, but we ought not to be hindered by another greatcoat, as we have now by some blunder about 3000, and we have camp-kettles and mess-pans enough for a large army.

        Ammunition should be immediately forwarded. I have approved an estimate of the ordnance officer to-day. I hope you will see it attended to; if not, I have not much faith in receiving it. We are very badly in want of wood for fuel, and a very great deal of suffering exists because of it; we are obliged to go 10 miles to pick up soggy and rotten driftwood on the beach, and the work is attended with great danger of capture. Every light vessel which comes down should bring a few cords of wood, proportioned to her size, the large steamers bringing 20 or 30 cords and the schooners 5 or 6, for the quartermaster’s department for issue to the troops. I am not sure

that it would be judicious to obtain our supplies direct from New York, if a class of vessels can be obtained which are light enough to come over this bar loaded and are fast. I bel4ve the change would be beneficial. We want boats here badly, and I have directed Captain Constable to call for twelve, four of which shall be life-boats. We require about 125 artillery horses for the batteries here.

        I understand my orders now to be, according to verbal communications from Major-General Washburn and dispatches addressed to him by the commanding general, which were received by me by the Alabama, and from the tenor of your letters of the 12th instant, not to attempt offensive operations, but to strengthen and fortify myself here and at Indianola, awaiting an increase of force and cavalry. Expeditions may be made for short marches into the interior, without much risk, but they are not attended with beneficial results. I doubt the policy of occupying a place, inducing our friends to ex-

pose themselves to certain punishment by espousing our cause openly, and then by a hurried abandonment for the purpose of securing our communication from interruption leaving them to the mercy of the assassins who have never been known to show mercy. I could, as I believe, march to Victoria any day, and occupy it, but the line from Indianola there is 40 miles, and from Lavaca there 26 miles, and without a heavy cavalry force it would keep my whole force actively engaged to keep that line secure in the face of such a force as Magruder has before us.

        I take it for granted the remainder of the Third Division is on the way. There are still four regiments of the First Division in Louisiana, and two of the Fourth Division. When the whole corps and all its artillery is in Texas, and all the efficient men detained in the convalescent camp and about New Orleans are with it, a portion of this column with that marching from the Rio Grande would, with the aid of the cavalry above mentioned, make us strong enough to assume the offensive vigorously, with a fair prospect of beating

Magruder in a hard-contested battle. I shall be very glad to receive you here, and will at all times be in readiness to aid you with all my powers, and to give effect to your orders with whatever ability I possess. I trust your health may now be such as to admit of your bearing the exposure of a campaign without subjecting you to the suffering you have lately experienced. I hope you will not think I have detained any member of your staff here, regardless of your wants and wishes; those I keep are such as I suppose, after consultation with Colonel Scates, Major Seward, and Major Ord, you would not care to have in New Orleans, and I am so poorly off in material here that they are indispensable to my operations here at present. You have only to notify me, when I shall send any and all you want, by the same steamer. I retain also a desk and printing press in the conviction that you can replace them in a moment in New Orleans, and I cannot get them here at all.

                                      I remain, with much respect and esteem,

                                              N.J. T. DANA,

                                              Major- General.

Pages: 165-6

CHAP. XLVI              CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. —UNION.

                                       HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

                                       Matagorda Peninsula, January 22, 1864

Maj. Gen. E. 0. C. ORD,

Commanding Thirteenth Corps, New Orleans:

        We are greatly crippled here for want of proper facilities for

transportation on our inland waters and of lightening vessels which

arrive at the anchorage off the bar (some 4 miles by the channel),

and which cannot come in. We have here now two small high pressure boats which cannot carry a great load, especially when batteries, troops, or wagons and animals are concerned. They are both so much worn out as to need constant repairs, and if by accident one of them gets aground, as one of them has been now for four days, we are completely, as the sailors say, on our beam-ends. Besides these (the Planter and Matamoras), there is the Warrior, entirely

unserviceable until her boilers are repaired, and now used only as a wharf-boat; and a propeller tug, called the Tyler, Which draws so much water that she can neither come over the bar or approach within three-quarters of a mile of the shore at Indianola except when the tide is well up. We have used her for towing a schooner back and forth to and from Indianola, the only means of transportation to that place which we have had at command for ten days.

        The Matamoras has been laid up for two days patching her boilers,

and is still out of use. In these salt waters it is absolutely necessary

for a high-pressure boat to clean out her boilers every two or three days; otherwise they are not safe, and in burning coal they are fast becoming seriously damaged. Neither of the high-pressure boats here are really safe. Should it at any time be necessary to hurry troops from here to Indianola or elsewhere, or from there here, or even across the pass here from one side to another, or to communicate rapidly with dispatches, we are unable to do it. The Continental, a steamer too heavy to come over the bar, is now in her fourth day at her anchorage outside, and not one-fourth of her cargo removed

from her. There is a boat there which has been there ten days, and is still unloaded. A new large steamer, supposed to be the Belvidere, appears there. this morning; she cannot come in. We have had tides 2 and 3 feet below the average for the last six days.

        Five hundred of the enemy was reported at dark last night on Matagorda Island, 10 miles below Fort Esperanza. I immediately stopped unloading the Corinthian, and sent over the Fifteenth Maine to re-enforce the garrison. I shall throw more troops across and some artillery if this morning’s reports still show that he intends to operate against us there. We must hold that point. It is now four days since I ordered the Seventeenth Ohio Light Battery and one 30 pounder Parrott to Indianola. We have thus far been able to move only one heavy piece and a section of the battery without animals. Should it be necessary, as it will be sooner or later, to outflank the enemy by movements over inland waters, we have not the means of carrying now more than 1,000 infantry, without artillery or cavalry, and could not land in half an hour over half that force. To do this we would have to use the pontoons, as I did to carry the 30-pounder to Indianola. We have here only ten pontoons.

        When the Warrior is repaired she will be our most useful boat, as

she can carry more than both the others together. I am informed that before my arrival here a master of transportation was sent down here by Colonel Holabird to manage the water transportation. One is of the greatest necessity, as none of our quartermasters are sailors and they can all be deceived by the officers on transports. This master of transportation, not liking the fix of things here, remarked that he had been promised to be made comfortable and that it could not be done here, and he left. Captain Garber informs me that he carried an estimate for the repair of the Warrior with him to New Orleans, but nothing has been heard of him yet. Captain G. informs me also that he has within a day or two received invoices of material for that purpose, viz, some rivets, tools, and small articles, but the article of which boilers are made, to wit, boiler iron, is not mentioned in the list.

        I must have two or three efficient quartermasters, live men, and.

who have some rank. Men who can be made use of nowhere and who have been changed around from place to place to be got rid of by everyone who has had them heretofore are of no service. I do not want them, and if they come, shall give them nothing to do. I would prefer to detail some energetic private from the ranks on extra duty for the duty. If I could get some officers of the quartermaster’s department who can do a little duty in the field as assiduously and incessantly as they do it in their easy chairs in some of our large cities I would like it. I am happy to inform you that I have no complaints whatever to make against the subsistence department. I

have had the good fortune to be ably and efficiently served by those

officers who have been with me.

        “To him that hath much, more shall be given.” I have a large number of crafts which are very indifferent, as I have reported above, and I now ask, in addition to men capable of managing them, to be supplied liberally with the means of mending them, and also with two powerful river steamers of not over 3 feet draught, capable of carrying large numbers of troops and animals, and which, by coming out of the mouth of the Mississippi after a norther, can safely reach here, and one propeller of power and not over 7 feet draught

when she has her coal on board. I am informed that the captain of the Planter has gone to New Orleans to sell his boat to the quarter-master. If she is taken at his valuation the Government will probably be swindled.

I have the honor to remain, with much respect,

                                              N.J. T. DANA,

                                              Major-General.

Pages: 277-9

Chap XLVI               CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION.

                                              HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

                                              Matagorda Bay, February 9, 1864.

Maj. Gen. E. 0. C. ORD,

        Commanding Thirteenth Corps, New Orleans:

        I have the honor to reply to your two communications of the 8th

instant. In stating what follows, I desire particularly to be under-

stood not as counseling a defensive policy here, for my opinions are

exactly the contrary, believing, as I do, that the results already ob-

tained by the great outlay of this expensive expedition fall far short

of satisfying the expectations of the country, and that the inactive

policy which has prevailed in Texas since its occupation, both here

and on the Rio Grande, has resulted in the loss of good opportunities, and tended, in some degree, to impair the impetuosity of this fine body of troops, and has decidedly increased the morals and confidence of the rebels.

        The longer this state of things exists, I frankly (perhaps too

frankly) and confidentially state to you, as I believe my duty to myself requires, it is my opinion the more the cause will suffer, first, by the enemy so strengthening his position (as he is constantly doing) and SO Concentrating his resources against us as to make it necessary, perhaps, to change our base and adopt other lines of operation; and, secondly, by so far influencing the morals of our troops, who now believe they can at any time march against the enemy with success, as to tend to their demoralization, especially so far as they will attribute their inactivity to the officers immediately commanding them. On assuming command of the troops here on the

12th of January I was then informed by Major-General Washburn, who had till then been in command, when he had 4,000 troops here, he could have marched against ~he forts at the month of the Brazos River with success, and he was confident that he then could have established his base at that point, and he expressed the opinion that the force here now was not relatively as strong as the force he then had.

        Considering the time the enemy has had to recover from his shock,

when he was first surprised at the safe lodgment of troops here, and to gather courage from our inaction, to fortify his approaches and to concentrate his re-enforcements, I am of opinion that General Washburn is entirely correct in his views. I have twice, previous to this, taken the liberty of suggesting plans of action for the forces in Texas. I felt it to be my duty, as I was, and am still, senior officer in the State, and felt that I would, by public opinion at least, be held responsible for idleness on the part of the troops collected here but at the same time I had not the absolute right to volunteer those opinions uncalled for. They have never been recognized or acknowledged, but I still entertain them more strongly than ever, although I know that the strength of the enemy has increased ever since and his preparations are more extensive and wider spread. There was not then a single company of men who could be styled soldiers west of Goliad; now Colonel Ford with 800 men is on the Nueces, near San Patricio, and a force gathering in reserve for him near San Antonio.

        Then the shore from here to the forts at the mouth of the Brazos

was unobstructed; now it is fortified in two lines, one on Caney, the other on San Bernard, and the army which has been there to contest our advance by that route will soon be able to leave the guardianship of it to a small force and move to our present front, occupying our lines of operations from the shores of Lavaca Bay toward Houston, Austin, or San Antonio. During the time I have been here, if my orders had not confined me to the defensive and restrained me from operations on the mainland, and if I had been supplied with a moderate force of cavalry, I could have operated with success. I

could still do so to some extent, gathering deserters, refugees, and horses, and demoralizing the enemy by successful raids, if not by direct attack. But although roads in this country have up to this time been in splendid condition, the nature of the ground is such that should a severe rainy season set in they could be used only with extreme difficulty and greatly increased means of transportation.

        I saw in the public prints that a large force of cavalry was at New

Orleans, and read notices highly laudatory of their condition and of those officers who were connected with the raising and equipping of them, and I was bold in asking, I entreated, for a cavalry force, even a small one, and I entertained the earnest hope that a part of that force, or at least the thousand men on the Rio Grande, or a detachment from both, could be sent me. I have no right to know or to ask to be informed as to the plans and intentions of my military superiors. I only do know the strength and efficiency of my own command, and what I can ascertain of the enemy’s field of operations, but I have felt it to be due to myself thus frankly and in proper official confidence to prelude my reply as above, and I offer the fol-

lowing answer to your queries, first premising, what you already know, that my orders are to fortify my position and be ready for defense, and not attempt occupation of the mainland with a view to permanent position or advance. If Magruder is at liberty, by our acting on the defensive, to concentrate his forces for the attack of either of our positions, Indianola should be re-enforced by not less than 3,000 men, to enable its garrison to hold the present position against such force as he could probably bring against it.

        The garrison of Matagorda Island should be increased to 2,000

men. There should be at Indianola not less than 500 cavalry and at Matagorda Island 150. I do not think there is a sufficient object to be gained by the continued occupation of this peninsula. Magruder cannot attack a respectable force here without great danger to himself, and could not with safety occupy it if it is evacuated, and if he did he could be easily dislodged and could not do much injury if allowed to remain. The principal object of it now is to

furnish an outlet for the few deserters who can make their way through the enemy’s lines at Caney. In advancing these views I always suppose myself aided by the naval squadron on the coast, as at present. In addition to the artillery we now have, there should be on Matagorda Island one Parrott rifle, 100-pounder, provided either with siege carriage or with chassis carriage, traverse circle and pintle, and implements complete, and two 20-pounder Parrotts, field guns; and at Indianola two 20-pounder Parrotts. These should

be supplied with 400 rounds each. Should Indianola be abandoned then the garrison at Matagorda Island should be increased to 3,500 men, with 250 cavalry.

        There should always be two light-draught gun-boats inside the bay.

You have already been informed by me that the enemy has four steamers (two of them cotton-clad) and two armed schooners at the head of the bay. These are not formidable and lie along the reef, with the channel filled up; but should the enemy and our selves reverse policies, they assuming the offensive and we standing on the defensive, they would not be long in cleaning out the channel and bringing out their flotilla. If Indianola is abandoned it will probably be occupied by the enemy and defended, and in event of its probable reoccupation by us would be burnt, together with the long wharf which is there. It seems to me we are bound to hold the place, not only by our own interests and policy, but in honor, as most of the people there have taken the oath of allegiance and would be endangered by our abandonment of them. The want of cavalry to keep the enemy’s mounted force from my communications and the fear of an order to abandon our friends at those places and the ad-

joining district, have alone prevented my occupying Victoria and Texana, and from collecting all that there is between Guadalupe and Colorado Rivers.

        The occupation of Decrow’s Point has prior to this compelled the enemy to keep a considerable force between the Caney and the Brazos, but as his fortifications there are now far progressed and extensive, and as the defile through which an army would have to advance by that route is very narrow, he is no longer compelled to keep his main force there to contest our expected advance. If I am permitted at any time to assume the offensive I desire authority to control the force on the Rio Grande, and also as much cavalry

up to 2,000 as can be spared me, all the absentees from this command who are now fit for duty and within the department, as well as recruits who are on the way, and 200 wagons. Then our enemies could be captured or whipped out of the State, and our friends would take care of the rest.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,

                                              N.J. T. DANA.

Pages 316-20

CHAP. XLVI             LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.

                               PIEDRAS NEGRAS, MEX., February 13, 1864.

Major-General DANA,

        Commanding U. S. Forces, Texas:

        SIR:    Your esteemed favor of the 8th instant came to hand a few

days ago, and in answer I would say, to prevent me from sending you an express to the counties where you are now operating every mesquite in the State would have to be garrisoned with rebel bayonets; and even so, freely would I mount my horse and brave the danger in support of liberty. The bearers, C. W. Wiun and Benjamin R. Bingham, are two young men of undaunted courage, and are as loyal as the planets, which time can never change from their course. They will be able to give you a great deal of information in regard to rebel movements in the State, also of this place.

        Disposition of rebel troops in Texas: Bragg commands the Trans-

Mississippi; Kirby Smith’s headquarters at San Antonio; Magruder, Green, & c., on the line. Magruder’s main line of base is from Galveston to Houston, with Velasco fortified. The main strength of his command is roughly estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000, sick, old, and lame. A great many of the men which he has on his line of base are without arms. He certainly has got a great many militia companies on the many creeks and settlements, on which the enemy

depend considerably, but when it comes to a muster Magruder will not find them. I have talked to a man or men from nearly every county in the State. All agree to say that Magruder is whipping himself daily. These men came to this point hauling Government cotton, a good many of them crossing their teams into Mexico. Benavides’ command of Mexicans is stationed about 16 miles from Laredo. His force is about 175 strong. At this point, Fort Duncan,

there are two companies, Captain Weyman’s and Captain Giddings’, both about 130 strong. Above the Las Moras, or Fort Clark, there is one company of militia, 60 strong, commanded by Major Alexander (a militia hangman). The orderly sergeant and 1 private left it at the Pedro Pinto; passed through here on their way to Brownsville to join the Federal army. He showed me the roll of the company. There are a great many men in it that belong to Union companies, but it is very difficult for such companies to organize until

after an advance of the Federal army.

        Colonel Ford is at San Antonio, and has got four or five cavalry

companies there, ranging from within 15 to 20 miles of the city. They do nothing but scout the country to prevent Union men from organizing. At Fort Inge there are about 40 men for the same purpose. Those are the only commands that I know of being in the State, and for the present it is a true report in relation to their

strength, excepting the main force under Magruder. After taking the figures of twenty reports, all from reliable gentlemen, I took average, which showed now 12,000 men. These gentlemen are from San Antonio, Austin, and Houston. A forward movement of the Federal army is anxiously, fervently, and hourly prayed for by at least two-thirds of the inhabitants of the State. Such would relieve many a lamenting wife, mother, and child, whose husbands,

are hunted through the mesquites and cedars of Texas, more than ever the wild mustang has been on the western prairie slopes of Texas. General Kirby Smith writes to Captain Hunter, who is a partner in business with him, as follows:

        After mature deliberation in relation to the intentions and movements of the Federals, I have come to this conclusion: They will first try to reduce Galveston, then Houston, and on to the capital, while a sufficient force will advance from the Rio Grande to occupy San Antonio.

        This I have from a gentleman who read the letter, and who I know

is as firm as the granite which is 50,000 feet under the earth. I cannot mention his name, fearing this may fall into the hands of the Confederates and thereby censure his family. The rebels report General Carleton, from New Mexico, to be stationed at Fort Lancaster, about 5,000 strong. Rebel Alexander said to his men at Pedro Pinto, above Fort Clark, that his object was to stampede Carleton’s horses when he advanced, in order to impede his progress.

        The rebels have ordered all stock removed from Las Moras, Pedro Pinto, and San Felipe to the interior, and if such orders were not complied with the soldiers would drive them off immediately. They also report a Federal advance on the Nueces, amounting to about 1,500 men. I do not credit the latter, as I sent a man from here a few days ago to ascertain the strength of Benavides’ command.

This man was at Fort Ewell and heard nothing of a Federal advance, notwithstanding I have an idea that Colonel Haynes may be in this direction. I pray God it may be so, and that he moves in this direction immediately. In regard to this place, I had my time set three times for the throwing of it. Under a call from Ford to refugees to return and join guerrilla companies by offers of pardon from Magruder, I sent over to Fort Duncan 50 men from this place, but the Jews and merchants at this place made it evident to the Con-

federate company at Fort Duncan that this refugee company was Union and sent over by me to surprise the rebels. The result was, my company was ordered to San Antonio under the pretense to receive their horses and arms, but the first night out they grappled the guard, crossed the river about 15 miles above here, and reported to me. It was then I prayed to have about eighty muskets and ammunition.

        In relation to the business of this place, I am happy to say that no

cotton has crossed the river in the last twenty days, arising from the rebel cotton having been embargoed by Patricio Milmo, of Monterey, for a debt which the rebels owed him. Magruder subsequently gave orders that no cotton for the present shall pass into Mexico. In retaliation Vidauri has closed the port and will not allow any goods or merchandise to pass into Texas. Judge Devine and Judge McKinney, as commissioners, have passed through here a few days since, enroute for Monterey to settle the dispute.

        There is at present in Eagle Pass about 5,000 bales of cotton. Gen-

eral, may I request you to order Colonel Haynes, if he is on the Nueces River, to proceed to this place forthwith and bring with him about 300 cavalry, three pieces of light artillery, and arms enough for at least 150 men, which I can raise here immediately. If this is done, we will secure all the property which is at this place; besides, our force will increase in the course of ten days to at least 1,500 men. Grass is getting good. Fort Ewell is from here but two days’ march and King’s Ranch from Fort Ewell is but about four and a half days march. Fort Ewell is on the Nueces about 40 miles above Laredo. A move of this kind would drive from all points on the Rio Grande those Christ-killing Jews, who are sucking the heart’s blood out of

the Confederates in Texas.

        Owing to so many refugees and deserters coming here and bringing their horses with them, the rebel officers at Fort Duncan got into the habit of coming to the authorities at this place and representing the horses as stolen; that said horses belonged to private individuals. The authorities, therefore, on many occasions before I came here, gave to the rebel officers the horses which actually belonged to the refugees, put them in prison and sent them to Monterey in confinement. A few days ago I drafted and forwarded an article to the authorities at this place, as emanating from a special military agent of the United States, the whole amounting to the respectfully demanding that the civil authorities at this place or any other in Mexico have no right to recognize the application for redress of any officer belonging to an armed band of outlaws which have got up in violence against their Government in America, and that such have no right to the benefits of any international law entered into between the United States and Mexico; and for the future all property taken or captured from said band of outlaws by the loyal American citizens or deserters I, in the name of the United States, would secure all such property to the importer of it into this country until such time as a true decision could be obtained from the United States and

Mexico. This has benefited the refugees considerably.

        Yesterday a gentleman to whom you gave a provisional commission to recruit in Texas arrived from the State at this point. He brought with him 30 men. He reports it very difficult to communicate with the Union men in Texas and had considerable difficulty. I cannot mention his name. He crossed the river about 15 miles below here, and on his arrival here the authorities at this place were very much surprised. These men were all armed and mounted. I was sent for immediately. I had the men to turn in all their arms until

leaving, and made the authorities aware of the fact that these men were not soldiers, but American citizens, who were compelled by an armed mob of outlaws to leave Texas in force, and that they were now on their way to where the Federal troops are, and that I therefore required a permit for them to carry their arms for self-protection when they would be leaving. This was granted. They started for Brownsville yesterday. The rebel companies on the other side kept under arms all the time they were here. Benavides arrived with reinforcements the morning the refugees were leaving. I would have

induced them to remain here, were it not that I had no way of subsisting them.

        I will not under any circumstances leave here until I get revenge

of the thieving Jews of this place. On receiving reports from all sides about that General Carleton was coming down the country, about ten days ago, I sent an express from here to meet him at Fort Lancaster. I wrote him a dispatch showing my business here and requesting him to send on two companies of cavalry immediately, at the same time giving him an accurate account of what strength he had to meet; but unfortunately my express man was waylaid at about 45 miles from here, just on the bank of the river where the San Fernando road crosses it to Fort Hudson. He got shot three times before he could get out his pistol. He was surrounded by 4 Mexicans, who, I presume, were hired for that purpose by Jew cotton speculators at this place. I have got three of them in the stocks. The express man is a valiant, courageous man, and is still living, although he got shot through the head. I had him brought into this

place and had him attended by an American doctor. He lost the dispatch, horse, and pistol. In the course of a few days I will know definitely whether Carleton is coming down the country or not.

        The Eighth (rebel) Texas Infantry has completely deserted. Of

Pyron’s regiment, 170 went home; of Woods’ regiment, 200 deserted or went over to the Federal lines.

        There is a spy on Matagorda Island by the name of Forrester, an

old man. He has got other associates. They report to the rebels all movements which you make. I cannot use the source I get this information from.

        General Green commands the left of Magruder’s army, which is on the Sabine River; General Bee the right, which is on Red River The center is opposite Galveston. Magruder has divided the State of Texas into five districts, having for their center San Antonio, Gonzales, Houston, Austin, and Edwards’ Ferry. He has ordered each of these places to be fortified on purpose to gather all the able bodied negroes together, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands’ of the Federals.

        As he conscripted all between eighteen and forty, nine-tenths of

the people southwestward of the Guadalupe are only praying for the Yankees to come on, even those that were heretofore secesh. They have lost their negroes, wagons, cattle, horses, and provisions, and their families are nearly destitute.

        Those two young men who start from here to your headquarters you can place the utmost confidence in them. They are shrewd and intelligent. Please on their return give them a little specie to enable them to return. If you wish to send an order to Colonel Haynes, one of these men will bear the dispatch and the other come to me. Please change horses for them on their returning.

        I wish you would give me permission to raise and enlist for the

Texas campaign a battalion or regiment at this point, and to be but subject to the orders of the first division commander to whom it might be stationed, and when in the field to the general in command. Such a battalion or regiment would relieve the courts of Texas from many a painful investigation hereafter.

        Law meted out to the hangmen of Texas never can or will be deservedly without resorting to means of this kind. I have got no heart now capable of forgiving. Right under my notice the other day two men came to the river on the other side. They wanted to cross some sheep. They were both arrested and the rebel soldiers took the sheep. In a few moments afterward these men tried again to cross the river, but the rebel soldiers hunted them through the

cotton bales and shot them both.

                               I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                       T.P. McManus.

        P. S.—This young man, C. W. Winn, has suffered much at the hands of the Federal army, very wrongfully indeed, as he was not known. If you require him he will relate all. Ii know him to be loyal, and ever was so, and a valiant young man.

                                              T.P. McManus.

Pages 343-45

CHAP XLVI                  CORRESPONDENCE, ETC -UNION

                               HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                               New Orleans, La., February 16, 1864.

Brig. Gen. C. P. STONE,

Chief of Staff, Department of the Gulf:

        SIR: In obedience to letter of instructions from Department head-

Quarters to visit the principal points on the coast of Texas occupied by my corps to satisfy myself by personal examination of the safety of the positions occupied, and further directing that if these positions can be securely held by a smaller force than is now there you (I) will please promptly report the fact; if re-enforcements of troops or vessels of war should seem to you (me) to be required you (I) will please report the amount and nature of re-enforcements necessary—

I beg to make the following report: I visited Decrow’s Point, where I found a division (Ransom’s); Fort Esperanza, where I found two battalions of black troops; aggregate present, 839; and Indianola, where is also a division (Benton’s). I recommend that Decrow’s Point be for the present abandoned; the garrison at Matagorda Island be increased to 2,000 infantry, one 1100-pounder Parrott and two 30-pounder Parrotts, and 150 cavalry; that the garrison at

Indianola should be increased by 3,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, eight 32-pounder howitzers (brass), and four 20-pounder Parrotts.

        The artillery are with 409 rounds of ammunition and complete implements, equipments, and carriages. Indianola I recommend should be held, if it is intended to begin active operations in Texas this season. Should it, however, be abandoned, the garrison of infantry at Fort Esperanza or Matagorda Island should be increased to 3,500 men. There should always be two light-draught gun-boats inside the Bay of Matagorda. A capable engineer officer is much needed for the works on this bay. The citizen, Mr. Baker, was unfit for such duty, throwing away labor in ridiculous, untenable earth

pens. I ordered him to report to Major Houston.

        The troops at the points on this bay are in fine health and condi-

tion, and General Dana reports that The want of cavalry to keep the enemy’s mounted force from my communications and the fear of an order to abandon our friends at those places and the adjoining districts have alone prevented my occupying Victoria and Texana, and from collecting all that there is between the Guadalupe and Colorado Rivers.

        I visited the force (one regiment, the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, and

two small companies Corps d’Afrique) at Aransas Pass (Mustang Island). Found them in excellent health, but in want of pay, clothing, and ammunition, all of which have been asked for from these headquarters by requisitions upon the department staff. Should that post be continued the artillery should be increased by four 24-pounder howitzers (brass, smooth) and eight or ten Coehorn mortars, so that an enemy approaching under cover of the sand-hills, among which the fort stands, could be reached by shells. The black troops

there and at all the points on this coast should be armed.

        At Brownsville, Tex., I consider the garrison ample, except in

cavalry. Were the so-called cavalry there mounted, armed, equipped, and paid, they would more than suffice, but the colonel commanding the cavalry brigade reports that not more than 200 of his horses are fit for immediate service on account of want of forage, and that these would not stand a long trip. The country is barren of forage of all sorts and the horses rapidly dying. Between 300 and 400 of the horses purchased from the Mexicans under the contract made by Colonel Holabird have already died, being lean, undersized Mustang ponies when delivered, and having had hard work and but little

forage since.

        The order to send part of this cavalry force (200) to General Dana

has just been to-day received by me. I do not deem it safe to leave General Herron on such an extensive frontier of arid plains without any efficient cavalry, which I would do if I ordered the 200 horses fit for the field to General Dana. I, therefore, shall await further directions in regard to this matter. Should the force at Brownsville be intended to operate on the enemy’s communications between that frontier and the habitable part of Texas, east of the Nueces, from which cotton comes, and to which supplies are being sent daily from Eagle Pass, a mounted force should be kept with General Herron of

800, by sending horses to him and proper arms, clothing, and equipments for the men.

        The mounted Mexicans are unreliable, except to steal horses, drive

cattle, and give information to the enemy when captured. They should all be put in the quartermaster’s department as vaqueros. Should, however, it be deemed advisable to keep a force on the Rio Grande simply to hold possession of the town of Brownsville and cover its own communications it would require in addition to the African troops now thereabouts a brigade of infantry, a battery of artillery with siege guns enough for the works, and five companies

of cavalry for outposts and vedette duties. General Herron asks for the following artillery for the works being constructed: Sixteen guns and howitzers of 24 and 32 pounds.

        There are four forts to arm, some of which are very extensive.

My instructions to General Herron (copy of which is hereby enclosed)*

* See p. 309.

directs him to repair old Fort Brown. Should his force be reduced to a single brigade, he should be provided with supplies of provisions and ammunition sufficient to enable himself to maintain his forces against any attempt to besiege him until he could be relieved. The field-works at Point Isabel are the only works I examined, which appeared well planned and well constructed. The garrison there should have a company of cavalry for vedette duty. In case the new route via Boca Chica is opened and found to work well, then the

garrison at Point Isabel can be reduced to one company of infantry, one of cavalry, and signal men and machinery enough to keep the garrison at Brazos informed day and night of any approach of the enemy.

        The lights at Ship Island Shoal, Pass Cavallo, Aransas, and Brazos should be restored, and a communication to the Light-House Board on the subject would, I think, be attended to. Reports from commanding officers and staff officers are enclosed,* giving information useful at headquarters.

        I respectfully call attention to the report of Colonel Davis, of the

cavalry. My medical inspector’s report, just received, will be copied and sent in as soon as practicable. An order was issued at Brownsville directing General Herron to collect the small-pox cases among the citizens and isolate them in a separate hospital, so as to prevent the further spread of that disease.

                       I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                              E.0. C. ORD,

                                      Major-General, Commanding Corps.

* Not found as enclosures

Page: 351

                       CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.—UNION.

                               HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

                               New Orleans, February 17, 1864.

Capt. F. J. SHUNK,

Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Gulf:

        CAPTAIN: General Ord, who has just returned from an inspection of the various points now occupied by our troops in Texas, recommends the following additional armament be sent to that coast, viz:

        Matagorda Island: One 100-pounder Parrott gun, two 30-pounder

Parrott guns.

        Aransas Pass: Four 24-pounder howitzers, four 24-pounder Coehorn mortars.

Brownsville: Sixteen guns and howitzers, 24 and 32 pounders.

        Will you have the goodness to inform me if you have such number and calibers and description of guns as are hereinbefore mentioned?

                                              CHAS. P. STONE,

                               Brigadier-General and ~2hief of Staff.

Page: 451-2

CHAP. XLVI                    CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. -UNION.

                               HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

                               Matagorda Island, Tex., February 28, 1864.

Brig. Gen. C. P. STONE

Chief of Staff, Department of the Gulf:

        This command being now reduced to less than a division, although

composed of several detachments, and the troops now here being mostly for fatigue and garrison duty and to hold this island, and there being now present with them two competent general officers, besides myself, viz, Generals Warren and Lawler, and as Major General Washburn, the permanent commander of the First Division, which composes the greater part of this command, is daily expected, according to private letters received here from him, and also General Benton, who also belongs to this command, being soon

due, I desire, as I cannot be of much further use here, to ask to be relieved from duty in the Thirteenth or s and ordered to report at the headquarters of the department. It is my wish, on reporting at the headquarters of the department, to ask for orders to report elsewhere for duty, to take an active command, preferably farther to the north.

                               I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,

                                              N.J. T. DANA,

                                               Major- General.

Page: 503

CHAP. XLVII                   CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. —UNION

                                       HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

                                       New Orleans, March 5, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,

Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

        GENERAL: I have the honor to state to you that the major-gen-

eral commanding is informed that the evacuation [of] Indianola by our forces will expose many families who have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States to the danger of expulsion from their homes. He desires that the officer commanding at Matagorda Island be instructed to receive all such persons under his protection, to provide through the commissary department for their proper subsistence, and to furnish through the quartermaster’s department transportation to New Orleans for all such who may desire it.

                       Very respectfully, general, your most obedient servant,

                                              CHAS. P. STONE,

                                      Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

Pages: 563-4

                                      HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                                      Matagorda Island, Tex., March 11, 1864.

Lieut. Col. RICHARD B. IRWIN,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department of the Gulf:

        COLONEL: Leaving New Orleans on the 6th instant, by the first

available boat, I arrived here on the 8th. Upon arriving I learned from General Dana that our stores, lately at Indianola, had been already removed to our camp on this island, pursuant to the order of the general commanding the department, and that our forces would follow from there on the 10th instant. Without disembarking here, I immediately proceeded to Indianola to inform myself of the situation there and returned next morning to this island.

        I found that the works in course of construction there were far

advanced toward completion, but were extended quite up to, if not beyond, the capacity of the force there to man them. On the 10th, ferrying over the intervening waters and riding toward Indianola, I learned that one of our transports there had been partially beached by a strong gale on the night of the 9th, and that our troops would be temporarily delayed there in consequence of that fact. It is represented to me that they will reach here by to-morrow or next day.

        The country for some distance around Indianola is understood to

be quiet. Yesterday and to-day I examined the works on this island, and find that they are being as rapidly constructed as the present available force will permit. As soon as our forces at Indianola arrive, the details for fatigue will be increased and the progress of the works accelerated. The two squadrons of cavalry which were ordered by the general commanding the department to be sent to this island have not yet arrived. It is important that they should be sent without delay to enable the ford between this island and the mainland, some 25 miles distant from here, to be guarded. The well being of both man and beast requires that condensers should be early sent to this and other points on this coast occupied by our troops, in order that a certain sufficient supply of good water may be provided.

        I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient

Servant,

                       JOHN A. McCLERNAND, Major-General, Commanding.

Page: 601-2

                              HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                              Matagorda Island, Tex., March 14, 1864.

Col. J. C. COBB,

Commanding Provisional Brigade:

        You will please send in to these headquarters, at the earliest possi-

ble moment to-day, a report of the number of men lost from your command in the accident at McHenry Bayou on yesterday. Accompany your report by a statement, based on the best information in your possession, as to the cause of the disaster and who, if any one, is to blame for it.

                                              Very respectfully,

                                              B. WILSON,

                                              Assistant Adjutant- General.

(Copy to Lieut. B. Frank Card, commanding Company L, First Indiana Artillery.)

                               HDQRS. PROVISIONAL BRIG., 1ST DIV., 13TH A.C.,

                               Matagorda Island, Tex., March 14, 1864.

Capt. B. WILSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

        SIR:    I have the honor to report the loss of 4 men from my command in the accident at Bayou McHenry yesterday. I have not been able yet to collect sufficient data on which to base an opinion as to where the responsibility lies.

        I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                      JOHN C. COBB,

                                              Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

                                       MATAGORDA ISLAND, TEX., March 14, 1864.

Capt. B. WILSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

        SIR:    Fortunately I lost no men in the accident at McHenry Bayou

on yesterday. Some of my men, however, were on the pontoon at the time, but from them I can learn nothing definite in regard to who was responsible for the disaster. Being unwell, I was not present when the occurrence took place.

                                              Yours, respectfully,

                                                      B. FRANK CARD,

                       Lieutenant, Comdg. Company L, First Indiana Artillery.

                               HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                               Matagorda Island, Tex., March 14, 1864.

Lieut. Col. ORAN PERRY

Commanding Sixty-ninth Indiana:

        COLONEL: I am directed by the major-general commanding to

request of you, at the earliest possible moment to-day, a full and impartial report of the distressing accident which befell your command on yesterday. Please state the number and names of the missing, whether or not everything possible under the circumstances was done for the preservation of life, and especially state your opinion, based upon the best information in your possession, as to what person or persons, if any, the responsibility for the disaster must attach.

        Sympathizing with you in the loss your regiment has sustained, I

remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                                      B.WILSON,

                                              Assistant Adjutant-General.

                               HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                               Matagorda Island, Tex., March 14, 1864.

Captain PATTERSON,

Commanding Pioneer Corps:

        CAPTAIN: You will please immediately prepare boxes or coffins

for 3 men of the Sixty-ninth Indiana Volunteers drowned in McHenry Bayou yesterday, and for any other bodies which may be recovered.

        By command of Major-General Dana:

                                              B.WILSON,

                                              Assistant Adjutant- General.

Pages: 643-4

                                      HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                                       Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 18, 1864.

Lient. Col. R. B. IRWIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Gulf:

        COLONEL: I respectfully invite the attention of the Secretary of

War, through the headquarters of the Department of the Gulf, to the following important facts: Within the brief period that has elapsed since I resumed the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps I have only been able to institute a personal examination into the condition of the First Division of the corps, now on Matagorda Island, Tex. I find that three field batteries, one company of heavy artillery, and a battalion of colored heavy artillery are now with that division,

viz:

        First. Company F, First Missouri Light Artillery.

        Second. Sixteenth Ohio Battery.

        Third. Seventh Michigan Battery.

        Fourth. Company L, First Indiana Heavy Artillery.

        Fifth. First Battalion, Fourteenth Rhode Island Heavy Artillery.

        Of Battery F, First Missouri Light Artillery, 25 men have re-en-

listed under Special Orders, No. 100, series of 1862, War Department,

in the new organization styled the First Regiment Mounted Veteran

Artillery, and are now discharged from their previous enlistment,

and on furlough.

        Between the 22d of April and the 8th of June, 1864, the enlistment

of 63 more will expire, leaving at the latter date, of original enlistments, but 26 men, present and absent. Of the Sixteenth Ohio Battery, 72 men have re-enlisted in the regiment above named, and are now awaiting their discharge and furlough, leaving but 54 men, present and absent, whose enlistment will expire on September 5, 1864. None of the men of the Seventh Michigan have re-enlisted, but the battery only numbers 83 men, present and absent. The batteries belonging to the Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions of

the corps are believed to be in like condition.

        Of the First Wisconsin Battery 40 men have re-enlisted; Company A, Second Illinois Light Artillery, 40 men; First Indiana Battery, 30 men; Company B, First Missouri Light Artillery, none; Company E, First Missouri Light Artillery, none; Second Ohio, no report received; Company E, Second Illinois Light Artillery, none; Company A, First Missouri Light Artillery, 25 men; Chicago Mercantile does not intend re-enlisting; Seventeenth Ohio Battery has re-enlisted in body. Thus it appears that the re-enlistments in the proposed regiment have diminished, these batteries to the same extent without materially promoting the completion of the regiment, and that from this and other causes the existing batteries of the corps have been rendered almost unserviceable, and must, with one exception, soon cease to exist.

        Upon these facts it is respectfully suggested whether effectual

means should not be immediately employed, either to fill up the proposed regiment or to remand the veterans who have re-enlisted in it to their former organizations, and to fill them up. The enforcement of the draft or the revival of the bounty of $400, extended not only to veteran artillerymen but to veteran infantrymen refusing to reenlist in the infantry, would early accomplish either of these objects.

It may be added, in conclusion, that the approaching expiration of the enlistments of the infantry of the corps also threatens danger to

the strength and efficiency of that arm.

                               Vey respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                      JOHN A. MeCLERNAND,

                       Major- General, Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps.

Pages: 645-6

                              OFFICE PROVOST-MARSHAL, HDQRS. 13TH ARMY CORPS

                               Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 18, 1864.

Major-General McCLERNAND,

(Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

        GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the line of couriers

between the lower end of Matagorda Island and these headquarters is established. Captain Armstrong, commanding Texas scouts, has his headquarters at the head of the Two Bayous, between which is the path to the Oyster Reef, and has one post of pickets at the State Channel through the reef. The first post of mounted infantry coming from the scouts is l ½  miles beyond the residence of Mr. Bledworth, and the station of Captain Wingett, commanding mounted infantry, is at 3 miles this side, east of the same. This is the nar-

rowest place on the island, and is designated as a rallying point in case of attack. The men are posted at intervals of 5 miles from that point to the residence of Mr. Wilkinson.

        I find the second island, crossing the reef, an excellent point of

defense, and believe that 15 or 20 resolute men could resist a regiment of cavalry and prevent their crossing the State Channel, which is cut just along the edge of the island. The approach is across a plain oyster reef, narrow, and of such a character as to prevent a rapid movement, and the shells thrown up by the dredging machine are on the island and would form an excellent protection to our men.

The path from the reef to Captain Armstrong’s, as well as all the posts up the island, have been designated by signal poles, and will be marked at night by fires.

        Hoping that these arrangements will meet with your approbation,

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

                                              J. B. GORSUCH,

                       Captain and Provost-Marshal, Thirteenth Army Corps.

Page: 737

                                      HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

                                      Alexandria, La., March 26, 1864.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. McCLERNAND,

Comdg. Thirteenth Army Corps, Matagorda Island, Tex.:

        GENERAL: Your communication of the 11th instant is received;

also one of the 14th instant, from Pass Cavallo, Tex. I am directed

by the major-general commanding to state that the chief quartermaster of the department has been instructed anew to forward to you the condensers for the use of the troops on the Texas coast. The two squadrons of cavalry have already been ordered to proceed to Matagorda Island.

               I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

                                              J. SCHUYLER CROSBY,

                                      Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Page: 738

               LOUISIANA AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI

SPECIAL ORDERS,                       THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

No. 68.                                Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 26, 1864.

        *       *       *       *

        IV. Companies A and F, Eighteenth Regiment New York Volunteer Cavalry, will be stationed about 1 mile west of the ranch at the lower end of Matagorda Island, now occupied by Captain Armstrong, Texas scouts, at a point convenient for the support of the outposts at Cedar Bayou and Oyster Reef. Maj. A. C. Matthews, Ninety-ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, will take command of the line of couriers and the cavalry, mounted infantry, and

scouts at and near Cedar Bayou. The outposts at Cedar Bayou will be increased to 20 men, in charge of a commissioned officer, and the outpost at the Oyster Reef will be increased to 25 men and a commissioned officer, the reserve to be held in constant readiness for the support of any point threatened. The various officers of the command will make themselves familiar wjth all available routes and crossings in their vicinity.

        The courier-posts will be maintained as at present established, at

intervals of 5 miles, and all messages will be forwarded with the greatest dispatch, such as pertain to the movements of the enemy to be communicated to Colonel Bailey, Ninety-ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry, commanding infantry outposts, to the headquarters of the Thirteenth Army Corps, and the headquarters of the First Division. Major Matthews will designate such signals for the use of outposts as will expedite movements in case of attack,

and will resist, with all his available force, the passage of the enemy of Cedar Bayou or the State Channel at the Oyster Reef.

                               By command of Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand:

                                              SAMUEL CALDWELL,

                                      Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

Page: 757

                                      HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                                      Matagorda Island, Tex., March 28, 1864.

Lient. Col. RICHARD B. IRWIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

        COLONEL: A Frenchman just from Victoria, Tex., reports that Duff’s regiment has not left Lavaca River, but other rebel troops have gone to Louisiana. He thinks there is a force, probably a small one, at Green Lake.

                                              Your obedient servant,

                                                     JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,

                                              Major- General, Commanding.

Page: 1058-9

                                      HEADQUARTERS LOCAL DEFENSE COMPANY,

                                      Lamar, Refugio County, March 18, 1864.

Col. JAMES DUFF,

Commanding Forces of the West:

        COLONEL:  I have the honor to report all quiet within my line of

duty. On the 17th instant a steamer appeared off Aransas Bar; there being too little water to cross, she steamed off in the direction of Saluria. On the 13th instant I received information from Hines Bay of the mysterious disappearance of a gentleman representing himself to be a Confederate officer, an engineer, and member of General Magruder’s military family. I visited Hines Bay on the 14th instant in person and conferred with Mr. Adams, an old resident of the place, with whom Captain Deas [Dietz], the officer in question, staid for the week previous to his disappearance. Mr. A. informed me in substance as follows: Captain Deas [Dietz] came to Hines Bay in an ambulance drawn by 2 mules, accompanied by his servant. He visited the Black Jacks and the extreme point of land connecting with Matagorda Island by reefs and islands, 16 miles below Hines Bay, three times—twice in company with one or more citizens of the bay, the third time alone upon a horse borrowed of

Mr. Adams, taking with him his compass and telescope, since which time he has not been heard of. I set out immediately with a detachment of my command, 12 in number, all men perfectly acquainted with the locality, to survey the country between Hines Bay and the reef. I traced the foot-marks of a horse to the reef, where it turned inland.

        I visited the first island, called Ayer’s Island, but could discover

no horse marks; but any one desirous of so doing might have left the mainland and crossed ~he island, without leaving a trace behind. I then ordered my men to scour the whole bay shore from Carlos Head to the Black Jacks, a distance of 30 miles, and see if they could discover any signs of a landing by the enemy; they reported no signs. Returning, I examined as closely as possible~

from the nature of the country (for miles an impenetrable thicket) the ground over which Captain D. must have traveled in going to and fro and bordering the bay shore, without result; I have therefore come to the conclusion from all the evidence that Captain Deas [Dietz] either crossed voluntarily or otherwise to the enemy at Saluria, or has been murdered in the Black Jacks and his body been concealed in the thicket. The horse borrowed by the officer has not been heard of since his disappearance. In my next scout to the isl-

and of Saint Joseph’s I shall probably hear through one of the residents of Saint Joseph’s and Matagorda Islands, with whom I communicate, if anyone has crossed from the mainland. I shall visit the islands the coming week.

                       I have the honor to be, colonel, your obedient servant,

                                              E.P. UPTON,

                                      Commanding Company, Local Defense.

Series 1 - Volume 34 (Part III)

Page: 26

GENERAL ORDERS,                       HDQRS. FIRST DIV., 13TH ARMY CORPS,

No. 26.                                Matagorda Island, Tex., April 3, 1864.

        In accordance with orders from headquarters Thirteenth Army

Corps, the major-general commanding hereby relinquishes the command of this division to Brig. Gen. Fitz Henry Warren.

        By command of Maj. Gen. N. J. T. Dana:

                                              B.WILSON,

                                              Assistant Adjutant- General.

Pages: 130-31

                                      HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

                                       Pass Cavallo, Tex, April 11, 1864.

Maj. A. C. MATTHEWS:

        MAJOR: Your dispatch of the 7th instant (among others) was

brought to my notice on my return from Brownsville. You are permitted, in the exercise of your discretion, to cross over with such portion of your command as you may think proper to Saint Joseph’s Island, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance and bringing away cattle and horses. I am informed that our forces left a number of horses on that island on their advance along the coast to Matagorda Island. As it appears that parties of the enemy have been hovering about Bayous, Oyster Shell Reef, and Corpus Christi, you will be careful to guard against surprise and to provide for your safe return. You may also, if you should think it entirely safe, extend your reconnaissance to the south end of Saint Joseph’s Island and ascertain whether the detachment on Mustang Island might not be transferred to a position on this side of Aransas equally eligible for commanding (by artillery) that pass, and more eligible for a camp. Should you extend your reconnaissance so far, you will, if you find it convenient to do so, communicate with Major Thompson, commanding on Mustang Island. To meet this contingency I will send a copy of this dispatch by the Steamer Saint Mary’s, now here. You will not, however, consider yourself in any way constrained against your judgment by this suggestion.

                                              JOHN A. McCLERNAND,

                                              Major- General, Commanding.

                                              (Copy to Maj. W. G. Thompson.)

Page: 369

There is a sheet that lists that the Thirteenth Union Army, under General McClernand’s command, the First Division, under Warren’s command was stationed at Matagorda Island. In that division were 238 officers and 4768 men. The aggregate number was 4068 men. There were also 12 pieces of artillery.

Series 1 - Volume 34 (Part IV)

Page: 213 - 14

                              OFFICE OF CHIEF ENGINEER, DEPT. OF THE GULF,

                               New Orleans, June 4, 1864.

Maj. Gen. N. P. BANKS,

Commanding Department of the Gulf:

        GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following statement, in

reply to your communication of to-day, in regard to the garrison of the military posts in this department. I will take up the posts in the order given in the list furnished me, as far as possible:

Matagorda Island — This point is of the greatest importance in view of the invasion of Texas, and if abandoned by us will be very difficult to obtain possession of again. In view of the favorable termination of the present struggle in the East, it is of great importance that we should possess a secure harbor on the coast of Texas, so that our forces could be rapidly thrown into the country and take prompt advantage of the disaffection following disaster to the rebel cause in the East. The garrison may be safely reduced to 2,500 men. I believe we have men enough to justify the holding of this place.

Page: 277

               CHAP. XLVI     CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. UNION.

                                      HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,

                                      New Orleans, La., June 9, 1864.

Below this heading was a chart that showed that at Matagorda Island, on this date, the Union Army had the First Division, First Brigade, Thirteenth Army Corps with 57 Officers and 1212 men, the Provisional Brigade, First Division, Thirteenth Army with 88 Officers and 2006 men, the 1^st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery F along with the 16^th Ohio Battery and Company G First Michigan Light Artillery had 15 Officers and 516 men.